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The	British	state	and	the	recentralisation	of	power:
from	Brexit	to	COVID-19
Joseph	Ward	demonstrates	how	through	Brexit	implementation,	Theresa	May’s	government
initiated	a	process	of	centralisation	of	both	policy-making	influence	and	administrative
resources	within	Whitehall.	These	centralising	tendencies	have	only	been	accelerated	by	the
COVID-19	crisis	under	Johnson.
The	immense	impact	of	COVID-19	on	British,	and	indeed	global,	politics	makes	it	difficult	to
recall	those	issues	that	dominated	the	political	landscape	before	it.	Measures	taken	by	Boris
Johnson’s	government	such	as	the	implementation	of	the	furlough	scheme	and	the	extension	of
policing	powers	to	enforce	lockdowns	at	national	and	now	local	level(s),	have	led	many	commentators	to	express
concern	at	the	extension	of	central	government	powers.
Whilst	it	is	clear	that	these	centralising	tendencies	have	been	accelerated	by	the	COVID-19	crisis,	it	is	important	to
trace	their	origins	and	nature	closely.	In	a	recent	article,	I	analyse	the	relationship	between	government
management	of	Brexit	and	the	centralisation	of	power	in	the	executive,	suggesting	that	from	the	May	government
onwards,	Brexit	implementation	was	used	as	a	vehicle	for	government	to	reassert	the	power	of	the	political	centre.
Drawing	primarily	on	Institute	for	Government	data,	I	demonstrate	how	in	terms	of	both	the	policy-making	influence
of	No.	10	and	the	size	and	budget	of	the	civil	service	in	Whitehall,	this	process	took	hold.
Executive	dominance	is	by	no	means	novel	in	the	British	political	system.	As	scholars	of	the	British	Political
Tradition	have	pointed	out,	traditionally	British	politics	was	seen	to	operate	through	the	principle	that	a	government
with	a	majority	in	the	Commons	could	govern	without	restraint.	This	so-called	‘power-hoarding’	model	of	democracy
was	limited	to	some	extent	by	the	reforms	of	the	New	Labour	governments,	such	as	devolution	and	the
implementation	of	judicial	review.	However,	others	noted	a	paradox	at	the	heart	of	Blair’s	programme,	with	a
simultaneous	strengthening	of	the	executive	behind	the	implementation	of	reforms	which	appeared	to	devolve
power.
The	article	is	framed	in	relation	to	these	debates,	and	draws	on	data	over	the	period	2016-2019	concerning:	(i)	the
makeup	and	focus	of	Cabinet	committees;	(ii)	departmental	structures	and	budgets;	and	(iii)	resourcing	and	staff
numbers	within	the	civil	service.	Analysis	of	these	criteria	in	relation	to	Brexit	implementation	reveals	a	process	of
state	restructuring	and	centralisation.
In	terms	of	policy	influence,	on	taking	office	May	decided	to	chair	48%	of	the	Cabinet	committees	she	attended,
proportionally	a	much	greater	number	than	Cameron	(35%).	Though	the	2017	general	election	result	temporarily
diminished	this	influence,	towards	the	end	of	her	premiership	May	once	against	chaired	more	committees	than	any
other	Cabinet	member,	including	the	Brexit	committee	and	its	two	sub-committees,	with	the	Europe	Unit	in	No.	10
becoming	the	heart	of	negotiations.
In	terms	of	staffing	and	resources,	though	the	austerity	measures	of	Cameron-Osborne	ensured	May	inherited	the
smallest	civil	service	since	WWII,	by	2019	one-fifth	of	the	jobs	cut	from	2010-2016	had	been	replaced.	These	were
predominantly	located	in	government	departments	focused	on	Brexit,	backed	by	£3.5bn	of	additional	funding	for
Brexit	preparation	in	2018	alone.
In	addition	to	internal	centralisation,	the	May	government	emphasised	the	legitimacy	of	No.	10’s	role	in
implementing	the	referendum	result,	and	side-lined	the	role	of	parliament.	In	this	vein,	May	initially	attempted	to	use
prerogative	powers	to	trigger	Article	50,	with	the	legal	case	brought	by	Miller	et	al	in	early	2017	demonstrating	the
potential	impact	of	judicial	review	on	policy-making.
However,	the	manner	in	which	May	latterly	sought	to	fuse	the	government	with	the	original	referendum	mandate
over	the	heads	of	parliamentarians	was	redolent	of	the	‘direct	representation’	some	democratic	theorists	have
recently	posited.	May	castigated	and	blamed	MPs	for	the	failure	of	the	passage	of	the	deal,	questioning	the
legitimacy	of	those	who	contested	her	proposals.	The	increasingly	fractious	relationship	between	the	executive	and
parliament	saw	the	former	frame	the	latter	as	a	chamber	of	delegates	obligated	to	vote	through	the	deal,	rather	than
one	comprised	of	representatives	elected	to	deliberate.
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This	approach	towards	parliament	was	accelerated	in	the	early	stages	of	the	Johnson	premiership,	with	the
prorogation	controversy	last	summer	and	the	withdrawal	of	the	whip	from	MPs	who	attempted	block	a	No	Deal
Brexit	in	September	2019	providing	evidence	of	their	endurance.	In	terms	of	internal	centralisation,	Johnson
appointed	Michael	Gove	as	Cabinet	Office	Minister	and	Chancellor	of	the	Duchy	of	Lancaster,	charged	with
coordinating	No.	10’s	agenda	throughout	government,	with	Brexit	front-and-centre.
Indications	from	the	COVID-19	period	suggest	these	trends	seem	set	to	continue.	In	terms	of	parliamentary	and
party	management,	the	failed	attempt	by	No.	10	to	parachute	in	Chris	Grayling	as	chairman	of	the	Intelligence	and
Security	Committee	and	the	attendant	removal	of	the	whip	from	Julian	Lewis,	provided	a	particularly	prominent
example.
In	terms	of	shifts	within	Whitehall,	the	resignation	of	Mark	Sedwill	and	appointment	of	David	Frost	as	national
security	advisor	suggests	a	willingness	to	politicise	the	recruitment	of	officials.	On	public	health	and	the	NHS,
proposals	to	reassert	the	powers	of	the	Health	Secretary	and	to	‘clip	the	wings’	of	NHS	England,	as	well	as	plans	to
incorporate	social	care	into	the	NHS,	presage	the	return	of	control	of	much	public	health	policy	to	central
government.	More	recently,	similar	curtailments	are	said	to	have	been	proposed	for	the	London	Mayoralty,	another
position	open	to	capture	by	oppositional	political	forces,	and	which	Margaret	Thatcher	sought	to	address	in	the
1980s.	As	has	been	noted	by	legal	scholars,	a	project	to	restore	and	extend	the	powers	of	the	executive	appears	to
motivate	these	measures.
Evidence	from	the	first	year	of	the	Johnson	government,	therefore,	indicates	that	whilst	Brexit	provided	the	initial
context	for	these	measures,	centralisation	of	power	and	policy-making	influence	looks	set	to	be	a	prominent	feature
of	British	politics	for	the	foreseeable	future.	The	ease	with	which	the	Johnson	government	has	reasserted	these
tenets	of	governing	is	arguably	testament	to	a	lack	of	fundamental	change	to	Britain’s	political	institutions,	despite
the	reforms	of	the	New	Labour	and	Coalition	governments.	However,	as	the	recent	exams	scandal	has	exposed,
such	an	extension	of	control	can	incur	political	costs,	with	the	diminished	role	of	arms-length	organisations	making	it
more	difficult	to	off-hand	the	blame	when	things	go	wrong.	This	may	yet	lead	Johnson	to	reconsider	his	approach,
given	the	myriad	difficulties	which	have	so	far	beset	his	administration.
_____________________
Note:	the	above	draws	on	the	author’s	published	work	in	Parliamentary	Affairs.
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